MONITOR PATRIOT CO. et al. v. ROY, EXECUTRIX

Whether BCRAs so-called "Millionaires Amendment," which relaxes campaign finance limits for opponents of congressional candidates spending more than $350,000 of their own money, violates either the First or Fifth Amendments.

Whether the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Acts ban on election season campaign ads by corporations violates the First Amendment.

Whether Vermont's mandatory limits on candidate expenditures violate the 1st and 14th Amendments and the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo? Whether Vermont's treatment of independent expenditures by political parties and committees presumptively coordinated if they benefit fewer than six candidates, and thereby subject to strict contribution and expenditure limits, is consistent with the 1st and 14th Amendments and the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC? Whether Vermont's contribution limits, which are the lowest in the country, which allow only a single maximum contribution over a two-year election cycle, and which prohibit state political parties from contributing more than $400 to their gubernatorial candidate, fall below an acceptable constitutional threshold and should be struck down?

Whether the three-judge district court correctly dismissed appellant's as-applied constitutional challenge to the federal prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds to finance "electioneering communications."

Whether an injunction, stemming from a defamation and privacy judgment, that ordered the petitioner never again to display a sign or speak about respondent Johnnie Cochran (favorably or otherwise) in a public place violates the petitioners First Amendment rights.

Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of the "soft money" provision (section 101) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 166 Stat. 81, because it constitutes an invalid exercise of Congress' power to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution; violates the First Amendment or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment; or is unconstitutionally vague. Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of the "electioneering communications" provisions (sections 201, 203, 204, and 311), of BCRA, because they violate the First Amendment or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, or are unconstitutionally vague. Whether the district court erred by holding nonjusticiable challenges to, and upholding, portions of the "advance notice" provisions, the "coordination" provisions, and the "attack ad" provision of BCRA (section 305), because they violates the First Amendment.

Whether certain advocacy groups can contribute to candidates campaigns. Currently, only individuals, political action committees, political parties and other campaign committees can give to candidates. More specifically, the issue is whether North Carolina Right to Life and other nonprofit advocacy corporations groups that raise money not through business ventures but through donations from supporters can make campaign contributions. Such groups have neither business interests nor shareholders.

Whether the Party Expenditure Provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 violates a political party's First Amendment rights by limiting the amount of money a party may spend in coordination with its congressional candidates.

Whether the Buckley v. Valeodecision authorizes state limits on campaign-contributions to state political candidates. Whether the limits approved in Buckleydefine the scope of permissible state limitations.

Whether several conditions placed by the state of Colorado on the ballot-initiative process infringe on political free-speech rights, including:
(1) a requirement that initiative-petition circulators be registered voters; (2) a requirement that circulators wear an identification badge; and (3) a requirement that proponents of the initiative disclose certain information, such as names and addresses of paid circulators and amount paid to each circulator.

Whether a public television station sponsoring a candidates debate may exclude a legally qualified candidate who the station does not believe can win the election.

Whether a political party's associational rights under the First Amendment require a state to permit multiple-party candidacies on the state's election ballot.

Whether campaign spending limits constitutionally can be applied against a state committee of a political party whose spending was not coordinated with a candidate.

Whether the government may constitutionally prohibit the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person issuing it.

Whether a state may constitutionally prohibit write-in voting.

Whether a state may constitutionally prohibit the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place.

Whether a state, through its election laws, may constitutionally (1) prohibit a political party in one district from using the same name that a different political party uses in another district; (2) require more signatures to get on the ballot in a multidistrict political subdivision than are required to get on a state-wide ballot; and (3) require a political party seeking to be on ballots in both suburban Cook County and in Chicago to obtain 25,000 signatures from both areas.

Whether, consistent with the First Amendment, a public figure can recover libel damages from the publisher of an article that attributes altered quotations to the public figure.

Whether the First Amendment requires a separate "opinion" privilege that restricts the application of state libel laws.

Did the Michigan Campaign Finance Act violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Can a public figure recover damages for emotional distress because of an offensive parody?

Can a court, in the context of a summary judgment request, award summary judgment in a libel action if the moving party had no evidence that a reasonable jury might disbelieve its opponent's claim?

Was Consumer Union's article written with "actual malice," thereby placing it outside the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Whether provisions of the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act restricting union and corporation's funds for political purposes to members of the corporation violate the First Amendment's guarantees of associational rights.

Whether a Kentucky statute prohibiting electoral candidates from offering materials benefits to voters in consideration for their votes violated the candidates free speech rights under the First Amendment.

Whether a $250 limit on contributions to committees in support of or opposition to ballot initiatives in California violated First Amendment guarantees of association and free speech.

Whether a provision of the 1971 Federal Elections Campaign Act prohibiting individual contributions of over $5000 to multicandidate political committees violated First Amendment guarantees of speech and associational freedoms.

Whether a state criminal statute that forbids certain expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals violates the First Amendment.

Do the Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits on electoral expenditures violate the 1st Amendment?

Whether a Florida statute that afforded a right to reply to personal attacks on political candidates by newspapers violated the First Amendment.

To what extent does a publisher (monthly newsletter) have a constitutional privilege against liability for defamation of a private citizen?

Whether a teacher's dismissal by the Board of Education for publishing a letter in a newspaper critical of the Board's allocation of funds violated his freedom of speech under the First Amendment.

Are public figures subject to the actual malice standard for libel as articulated in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964)?

Whether a newspaper column asking a series of questions that could be read as defamatory is protected by the First Amendment, as articulated by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964).

Whether the freedom of speech provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect a criminal suspect who makes a false statement about a police officer without "actual malice."

To what extent does the First Amendment protections for speech and press limit a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct?

Whether the distribution of a racist leaflet, in violation of a state criminal libel statute, was protected under the First Amendment.

Whether a Minnesota statute that allowed "abatement"—an injunction against future publication—of printed material deemed to be a public nuisance constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.