Opinions

Majority Opinion Author

Elena Kagan

Read FIRE's Amicus Brief in Counterman v. Colorado

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO

certiorari to the court of appeals of colorado

No. 22–138. Argued April 19, 2023—Decided June 27, 2023

From 2014 to 2016, petitioner Billy Counterman sent hundreds of Facebook messages to C. W., a local singer and musician. The two had never met, and C. W. did not respond. In fact, she tried repeatedly to block him, but each time, Counterman created a new Facebook account and resumed contacting C. W. Several of his messages envisaged violent harm befalling her. Counterman’s messages put C. W. in fear and upended her daily existence: C. W. stopped walking alone, declined social engagements, and canceled some of her performances. C. W. eventually contacted the authorities. The State charged Counterman under a Colorado statute making it unlawful to “[r]epeatedly . . . make[ ] any form of communication with another person” in “a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause that person . . . to suffer serious emotional distress.” Colo. Rev. Stat. §18–3–602(1)(c). Counterman moved to dismiss the charge on First Amendment grounds, arguing that his messages were not “true threats” and therefore could not form the basis of a criminal prosecution. Following Colorado law, the trial court rejected that argument under an objective standard, finding that a reasonable person would consider the messages threatening. Counterman appealed, arguing that the First Amendment required the State to show not only that his statements were objectively threatening, but also that he was aware of their threatening character. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed his conviction. The Colorado Supreme Court denied review.

Held: The State must prove in true-threats cases that the defendant had some subjective understanding of his statements’ threatening nature, but the First Amendment requires no more demanding a showing than recklessness. Pp. 4–14.

(a) The First Amendment permits restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas. Among these historic and traditional categories of unprotected expression is true threats. True threats are “serious expression[s]” conveying that a speaker means to “commit an act of unlawful violence.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359. The existence of a threat depends not on “the mental state of the author,” but on “what the statement conveys” to the person on the receiving end. Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 733. Yet the First Amendment may still demand a subjective mental-state requirement shielding some true threats from liability. That is because bans on speech have the potential to chill, or deter, speech outside their boundaries. An important tool to prevent that outcome is to condition liability on the State’s showing of a culpable mental state. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526. That kind of “strategic protection” features in this Court’s precedent concerning the most prominent categories of unprotected speech. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342. With regard to defamation, a public figure cannot recover for the injury such a statement causes unless the speaker acted with “knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280. The same idea arises in the law respecting obscenity and incitement to unlawful conduct. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109; Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 122–123. And that same reasoning counsels in favor of requiring a subjective element in a true-threats case. A speaker’s fear of mistaking whether a statement is a threat, fear of the legal system getting that judgment wrong, and fear of incurring legal costs all may lead a speaker to swallow words that are in fact not true threats. Insistence on a subjective element in unprotected-speech cases, no doubt, has a cost: Even as it lessens chill of protected speech, it makes prosecution of otherwise proscribable, and often dangerous, communications harder. But a subjective standard is still required for true threats, lest prosecutions chill too much protected, non-threatening expression. 

(b)  In this context, a recklessness standard—i.e., a showing that a person “consciously disregard[ed] a substantial [and unjustifiable] risk that [his] conduct will cause harm to another,” Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686, 691—is the appropriate mens rea. Requiring purpose or knowledge would make it harder for States to counter true threats—with diminished returns for protected expression. Using a recklessness standard also fits with this Court’s defamation decisions, which adopted a recklessness rule more than a half-century ago. The Court sees no reason to offer greater insulation to threats than to defamation. While this Court’s incitement decisions demand more, the reason for that demand—the need to protect from legal sanction the political advocacy a hair’s-breadth away from incitement—is not present here. For true threats, recklessness strikes the right balance, offering “enough ‘breathing space’ for protected speech,” without sacrificing too many of the benefits of enforcing laws against true threats. Elonis, 575 U. S., at 748. Pp. 10–14.

(c) The State prosecuted Counterman in accordance with an objective standard and did not have to show any awareness on Counterman’s part of his statements’ threatening character. That is a violation of the First Amendment. 

497 P.3d 1039, vacated and remanded.

Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Gorsuch, J., joined as to Parts I, II, III–A, and III–B. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Barrett, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined.

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