CHARLES W. BURSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND REPORTER FOR TENNESSEE v. MARY REBECCA FREEMAN

Whether BCRAs so-called "Millionaires Amendment," which relaxes campaign finance limits for opponents of congressional candidates spending more than $350,000 of their own money, violates either the First or Fifth Amendments.

Whether the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Acts ban on election season campaign ads by corporations violates the First Amendment.

Whether Vermont's mandatory limits on candidate expenditures violate the 1st and 14th Amendments and the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo? Whether Vermont's treatment of independent expenditures by political parties and committees presumptively coordinated if they benefit fewer than six candidates, and thereby subject to strict contribution and expenditure limits, is consistent with the 1st and 14th Amendments and the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC? Whether Vermont's contribution limits, which are the lowest in the country, which allow only a single maximum contribution over a two-year election cycle, and which prohibit state political parties from contributing more than $400 to their gubernatorial candidate, fall below an acceptable constitutional threshold and should be struck down?

Whether the three-judge district court correctly dismissed appellant's as-applied constitutional challenge to the federal prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds to finance "electioneering communications."

Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of the "soft money" provision (section 101) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 166 Stat. 81, because it constitutes an invalid exercise of Congress' power to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution; violates the First Amendment or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment; or is unconstitutionally vague. Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of the "electioneering communications" provisions (sections 201, 203, 204, and 311), of BCRA, because they violate the First Amendment or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, or are unconstitutionally vague. Whether the district court erred by holding nonjusticiable challenges to, and upholding, portions of the "advance notice" provisions, the "coordination" provisions, and the "attack ad" provision of BCRA (section 305), because they violates the First Amendment.

Whether certain advocacy groups can contribute to candidates campaigns. Currently, only individuals, political action committees, political parties and other campaign committees can give to candidates. More specifically, the issue is whether North Carolina Right to Life and other nonprofit advocacy corporations groups that raise money not through business ventures but through donations from supporters can make campaign contributions. Such groups have neither business interests nor shareholders.

Whether the Party Expenditure Provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 violates a political party's First Amendment rights by limiting the amount of money a party may spend in coordination with its congressional candidates.

A Colorado statue establishes a 100-foot zone around the entrance to any "health care facility." Within this buffer zone, people may not, without consent "knowingly approach another person within 8 feet," for the purpose of passing out literature or engaging in "oral protest, education, or counseling" on a public sidewalk. The question is whether the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the speaker are abridged by the protection the statute provides for the unwilling listener.

Whether the Buckley v. Valeodecision authorizes state limits on campaign-contributions to state political candidates. Whether the limits approved in Buckleydefine the scope of permissible state limitations.

Whether several conditions placed by the state of Colorado on the ballot-initiative process infringe on political free-speech rights, including:
(1) a requirement that initiative-petition circulators be registered voters; (2) a requirement that circulators wear an identification badge; and (3) a requirement that proponents of the initiative disclose certain information, such as names and addresses of paid circulators and amount paid to each circulator.

Whether a public television station sponsoring a candidates debate may exclude a legally qualified candidate who the station does not believe can win the election.

Whether a political party's associational rights under the First Amendment require a state to permit multiple-party candidacies on the state's election ballot.

Whether campaign spending limits constitutionally can be applied against a state committee of a political party whose spending was not coordinated with a candidate.

Whether a public university can deny funds to a religious student group that it provides to nonreligious student groups.

Whether the government may constitutionally prohibit the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person issuing it.

Whether an injunction that limits the places where and the manner in which antiabortion protestors may demonstrate violates the First Amendment.

Whether a governmental entity may constitutionally prohibit the distribution of literature and the solicitation of contributions in airport terminals.

Whether a state may constitutionally prohibit write-in voting.

Whether a state, through its election laws, may constitutionally (1) prohibit a political party in one district from using the same name that a different political party uses in another district; (2) require more signatures to get on the ballot in a multidistrict political subdivision than are required to get on a state-wide ballot; and (3) require a political party seeking to be on ballots in both suburban Cook County and in Chicago to obtain 25,000 signatures from both areas.

Is a sidewalk on post office property, which is intended only to facilitate traffic to and from the post office, a public forum? Does a government ban on solicitation emanating from such a sidewalk violate the First Amendment rights of respondents?

Did the Michigan Campaign Finance Act violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Whether a Brookfield, Wisconsin ordinance making it "unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual," and declaring that the primary purpose of the ban is to "protect[t] and preserve[e] the home" violates freedom of speech and expression under the First Amendment.

Whether a resolution banning all "First Amendment activities" at Los Angeles International Airport violates the First Amendment

Whether federal exclusion of legal defense and political advocacy organizations from participation in a charity drive aimed at federal employees violates the First Amendment

Whether a federal statutewhich bans picketing and the distribution of leaflets on the public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Courtviolates the 1st Amendment.

Whether provisions of the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act restricting union and corporation's funds for political purposes to members of the corporation violate the First Amendment's guarantees of associational rights.

Whether a Kentucky statute prohibiting electoral candidates from offering materials benefits to voters in consideration for their votes violated the candidates free speech rights under the First Amendment.

Whether a $250 limit on contributions to committees in support of or opposition to ballot initiatives in California violated First Amendment guarantees of association and free speech.

Whether a public university’s interest in maintaining a "strict separation of church and state" allows it to bar religious student groups from reserving facilities for worship.

Whether a provision of the 1971 Federal Elections Campaign Act prohibiting individual contributions of over $5000 to multicandidate political committees violated First Amendment guarantees of speech and associational freedoms.

Whether a 1934 federal statutewhich imposes a $300 fine on anyone who willfully deposits mailable matter in a letterbox without proper postageviolates the 1st Amendment free speech rights of organizations and individuals who spread their messages by putting pamphlets and other materials in private mailboxes.

Whether a state, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, may confine religious organizations wishing to sell and distribute religious literature at a state fair to an assigned location within the fairgrounds.

Whether the 1st and 14th Amendments protect the right of individuals to solicit signatures for political petitions in privately owned shopping centers.

Whether a city ordinancewhich bars door-to-door solicitation by charities that cannot prove that 75% of their proceeds go directly to charitable purposesviolates the 1st and 14th Amendment free speech rights of solicitors.

Whether a state criminal statute that forbids certain expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals violates the First Amendment.

Whether a government ban on political rallies on military bases violates the 1st Amendment.

Whether striking union members have a First Amendment free speech right to picket inside a shopping center in order to advertise their strike against the owner of one of the stores.

Do the Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits on electoral expenditures violate the 1st Amendment?

Whether a city-owned placard on the side of a city bus, which has been opened for commericial advertising use but not political advertising, is a public forum.

Whether the city’s “anti-picketing” ordinance and “anti-noise” ordinance violated the First Amendment.

Does a Chicago city ordinance which bans non-union picketing within 150 feet of a school building violate both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Whether respondents, in exercise of asserted First Amendment rights, may distribute handbills in a private shopping mall contrary to the owner's wishes and contrary to a policy enforced against all handbilling.

Whether a statute under which an individual can require a mailer to stop all future mailings that the person "believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative" violates the mailer's rights of free speech and due process.

Whether large shopping plazas are "public forums" where all citizens have a First Amendment right to petition and engage in peaceful expression. Picketing as protected free expression and the distinction between public forum v. property rights were also at issue.

Whether 1st and 14th Amendment freedoms give students the right to engage in peaceful protests on jailhouse grounds.

Whether a breach of the peace conviction arising out of a peaceful sit-in in a segregated library infringed upon the petitioners First Amendment free speech, assembly, and petition rights.

Do statutory "disturbance of the peace" and "obstruction of public passageways" convictions, for a peaceable demonstration that contains speech that may potentially incite violence, infringe on a demonstrator's First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly?

Do statutory "disturbance of the peace" and "obstruction of public passageways" convictions, for a peaceable demonstration that contains speech that may potentially incite violence, infringe on a demonstrator's First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly?

Whether the First Amendment was violated when civil rights protestors, marching in front of the state house, were arrested after refusing to disperse when a crowd gathered.

Whether a "Green River Ordiance" which bans the soliciting of individuals on their property without their consent violates the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment freedom of speech rights of magazine solicitors.

Whether a state, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, can impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to distribute religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes of the town's management.

Whether a local ordinance that prohibited any person from "distributing handbills, circulars or other advertisements to ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon" a home dweller violated the First and Fourteenth Amendemnts.

Whether a state law prohibiting a parade or procession on a public street without a special license violates the First Amendment.

Whether a city ordinance mandating a permit to canvass or distribute circulars violated the First Amendment's freedom of speech

Whether a city ordinance that forbade public assembly in the streets or parks of the city without a permit is an unconstitutional violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments freedoms of speech and assembly.

Whether a city can prohibit an individual from preaching on a citys common without a permit from the mayor.