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Supreme Court Will Give Guidance on Excluding Expert Testimony

By David M. Axelrad and Mary Christine Sungaila

In "Will State Supreme Court Shift Balance of Dower Between Joudges and Juries?" (Daily Journal, August 14), attorney Mar-tin Buchanan suggests that the issue before the Supreme Court in the Lockheed Litigation Cases (S122167) is whether California should radically transform the rela-tionship butwent index and large tionship between judges and juries by giving trial judges Daubert-type power (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)) to review the admissibility of expert testimony. In fact, California trial judges have long had the authority under the Evidence Code

authority under the Evidence Code to deternine whether an expert's opinion has a sufficient foundation to be admissible in evidence. California Evidence Code Sec-tion 801 limits expert testimony to matter 'of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates." Upon objection, a trial court is statutorily required to 'ex-clude testimony in the form of an opinion that is based in whole or in semificant ard to matter that is opinion that is based in Whole of in significant part on matter that is not a proper basis for such an opin-ion." (Cal. Evid. Code Section 803; see also, Young v. Bates Valve Bag Corp., 52 Cal. App.2d 86 (1942).)

See also, 10ma P. 10ma 7 uite Aug Carp, 52 Cal. App.2d 86 (1942).) Under this statutory scheme, the Court of Appeal has consistently recognized a trial court's duty to examine the foundation of expert opinions and exclude testimony that lacks proper foundation. See e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Zucker-man, 189 Cal.App.3d 1113 (1987) ("Courts, both trial and appellate, have the responsibility of insuring that an expert's determination of value takes into account only rea-sonable and credible factors"; id. 1136 (criticizing trial court for accepting expert's "conclusion[s] without any critical assessment of the reasoning employed and the assumptions relied upon," and the sasumptions relied upon," and reversing and remanding for a new trial); Westrec Marina Management Inc. v. Jardine Ins. Brokers Orange County Inc., 85 Cal.App.4th 1042 (2000) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert is discretion in excluding expert testers expect failed to use "reliable statistical information" and that to statistical information" and that to statistical information" and that to Diago n. Science, 65 Cal. App. 4th 379 (1998) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony or valuation of goodwill, where testimony was founded upon matter insufficient to form a proper basis for such option"). *Kolas n. Regress of University of California*, 115 Cal.App.4th 283 (2004) (trial court erred in admit-ting testimony of human resources expert as to whether an employer had a retaliatory motive in firing an employee because the expert opin employee because the expert opin-ion "lacked any reliable foundation" in the expert's professional experi-ence or expertise.) By requiring trial courts to review the foundation for expert

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testimony before allowing that tes-timony to be admitted, Evidence Code Sections 801 and 803 assure "the reliability and traveorthiness" in forming their opinions." Gee Cal, Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3 West's Ann. Evid. Code, foll. Section 801, p. 21.) Recognizing that a trial judge must be able to fully examine the reliability of the foundation for expert testimony also gives effect to the basic prin-ciple that "(Ilhe value of opinion reached but in the factors consid-ered and the reasoning employed," and that "[w]here an expert bases his conclusion upon assumptions which are not supported by the experts, or upon factors which are not easonably relied upon by other experts, or upon factors which are speculative, remote or conjec-tural, then his conclusion has ne videntiary value" and is therefore properly excluded from evidence. (Zuckerman, supra, at 1135) In an earlier decision in Lockheed Litigation Cass (115 Cal.App.th

Litigation Cases (115 Cal.App.4th 558 (2004) (Lockheed I)), the court upheld exclusion of the testimony of the plaintiffs' sole causation ex-pert, Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum, based pert, pr. Daniel Tettelbaum, based on the lack of a reliable foundation for his testimony, and then granted summary judgment for the defen-dants. Teitelbaum had relied exclusively on a signed surgery of oxiderial-large

Teitelbaum had relied exclusively on a single survey of epidemiology studies to support his opinion that the defendants' chemicals — five cleaning solvents used in mani-facturing aircrafts — increased the risk of contracting the types of cancer at issue. But the survey established only that painters exposed to a complex mixture of thousands of chemicals, containing only three of the defendants' five chemicals, showed an increased risk of cancer. risk of cancer

Tisk of cancer. The plaintiffs argued that the court had no authority to exam-ine these deficiencies because Evidence Code Section 801 al-Evidence Cone Section out ar-lows a trial court to examine only whether the type of study on which an expert relies is generally of the type on which experts tend to rely type on which experts tend to rely — for example, epidemiology stud-ies — without examining the rel-evance of the study's content to the particular opinion being offered. In affirming the trial court's exclu-sion of this testimony, the Court of Appeal made clear that Evidence Code Section 801 requires a link between the matter the expert relies on and the opinion being of-fered. The court concluded that "an expert opinion based on specula-tion or conjecture is inadmissible." (*Ud.* at 564.)


In Locked II, now before the systeme Court, the court reierated that in "determin-ing whether there is a reasonable basis for an expert opinion" under Section 801, a trial court "must examine the matter that the expert relied on in forming his or her opin-on." The court made clear that this "analysis is limited to determining

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whether the matter relied on can provide a reasonable basis for the opinion or, on the other hand, reveals that the opinion is based reveals that the opinion is based on a leap of logic, conjecture, or artifice." (Lockheed Litigation Cases, 126 Cal.App.4th 271 (2005) (Lockheed II), review granted April 13, 2005, Case No. S122167.) The Lockheed II plaintiffs claimed

The Goldener plant of the second seco that the trial court abused its dis

· The epidemiology studies on which Teitelbaum relied did not show that the chemicals at issue increased the risk of contracting the type of adverse health effects the plaintiffs allegedly experienced. (See Lockheed II at 287-288.)

 (See Lockneed II at 251-285.)
The animal studies on which Teitelbaum had relied supplied no basis for his opinion in the case be-cause they failed to show that any cause they tailed to show that any of the specific chemicals at issue were responsible for the plaintiffs' adverse health effects, they ana-lyzed diseases that the plaintiffs did not have, and they could not be reliably extrapolated to humans. (*Id.* at 294-295).

Printing Catagonases a composition of support (d) at 294-295 did not support Teitelbaum's opinion about general causation. Case reports are anec-dotal observations of symptoms in a single patient or a small group of patients. Case reports do not iso-late or exclude potential alternative causes, investigate or explain the mechanism of causation, or draw

conclusions about a chemical's abil-ity to cause a particular adverse health effect in humans generally. (U. at 255.) • The treatises and registries of toxic effects which Teitelbaum re-lied upon concluded there was only a possible association between the chemicals and diseases at issue, provide the state of the teiter of the chemicals and diseases at issue, this was insufficient in a toxic tort case, in which "a plaintiff must presend expert testimony afficient cal probability" — that is "more than a mere possibility" — that the defendant's conduct contributed to the plaintiff singury. (U. at 287). delendant's conduct contributed to the plaintiff's injury. (Id. 42 287.) The Court of Appeal reached a conclusion contrary to Lockheed in Roberti v. Andy's Termitle & Pest Control Inc., 113 Cal.App.4th 833 (2003). In that case, Michael Roberti claimed that his autism was caused by in utero exposure 893 (2003). In that case, Michael Roberti claimed that his autism was caused by in utero exposure to the pesticle Dursban, which was applied in the cellar of the Roberti home while his mother was pregnant with him. The trial court excluded the plaintiff's expert testi-mony at the motion in limine stage because the experts relied on a novel application of animal studies to humans that failed the "general acceptance" admissibility test set to the application of animal studies were speculative. The Roberti Court of Appeal Teversed, in part because it deter-mined that "a more extensive pre-liminary admissibility test as a "Daubert-style analysis" which ap-plies only in federal courts. But arrayed against Roberti a esti-he sourts" court angular derist.

"Daubert-style analysis" which ap-plies only in federal courts. But arrayed against Roberti are a number of recent appellate deci-sions that support a trial court's examination of expert testimony under Evidence Code Section 801, as approved in both of the Lockhead Litigation Cases opinions. Ceffoten v. D'Andraz, 137 Cal.App.4th 1298 (2006) (upholding under Sections 901, the trial court's exclusion of speculative and conjectural expert testimony in mold litigation). Jen-mings v. Palomar Pomerado Health (2003) ('Exclusion of expert opin-ions that rest on guess, surmise or conjecture is an inherent corollary to the foundational predicate for admission of the expert testimony; will the testimony assist the trier of

fact to evaluate the issues it must decide?); I.d. at 1118 ("The plain-tiff must offer an expert opinion that contains a reasoned explana-tion illuminating why the facts have convinced the expert, and therefore should convince the jury, the title means that the experts that it is more probable than not the negligent act was a cause-in-fact of regligent act was a cause-infact of the plaintiff's injury"); Busiling r. Fremont Medical Center 117 Cal.App.4th 433 (2004) (An "ex-pert opinion may not be based on assumptions of fact that are with-out evidentiary support or based on factors that are speculative or conjectural, for then the opinion has no evidentiary value and does not assist the trier of fact"); and People v. Mitchell, 110 Cal.App.4th 772 (2003) ("R]egardless of whether evidence is deemed 'sci-entific," it will not be admitted un-less it is relevant... In California less it is relevant. ... In California evidence is relevant only if it has 'any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact.' And an


disprove any disputed fact¹ And an expert's testimony must be based on matter 'that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert). Pre-admissibility evaluation of the reliability of expert testimony is consensus in state courts across the country. Thirty-eight states require trial jadges to determine the reliability of expert testimony before allowing that testimony to he heard by a jury. With the everbe heard by a jury. With the ever-increasing use of expert testimony, and the corresponding increase in complexity of the scientific studies on which experts rely, both the bench and the bar in California need guidance concerning the trial courts' ability to filter that trial courts' ability to filter that testimony and limit parties to presenting to a jury only those expert opinions that have a proper foundation. The Supreme Court's upcoming analysis in *Lockhead II* of the trial courts' responsibility under Evidence Code Section 801 should provide that guidance.

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9th Circuit Was Wrong to Let School Censor Student's T-Shirt

By Michael Oberst

I is axiomatic in a country that yalanes and protects the right of free speech and academic freedom that the society has to be willing to put up with a certain amount of personal disconfort if speech and houghts are in fact go-ing to remain free. There is no place where this is supposed to be more true than in the academic setting, meachilly through also in the academic setting. especially among older students in high school and college. This is the main reason why the recent opinion of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in a closely watched academ ic-freedom case, is so troubling. It is true, of course, that school administrators are allowed to be more restrictive at the high-school level than at the college level. But any precedent that endows school administrators with wide latitude to censor public high schools provides college censors with a dangerous opening to acress for exampling censor public high schools provides college censors with a dangerous opening to argue for expanding censorship in higher education. In July, the full membership of the 9th Circuit refused to rehear en banc the case of high-school student Upter Chase Harper. *Harper n. Poway Unified School Distric*, 2006 DIDAR 10022, Harper had worn to school a T-shirt with the message "Be Ashamed, Our School Has Embraced That Which God Has Condemned" emblazoned on one side, and "Homosexuality Is a Sin. Romans 1:27" on the other. Harp-er's Tshirt was not some example of hate speech coming out of the blue. Rather, it was int response — a not transgender teenagers. Rather than see Harper's T-shirt as a form of protest against the official point of protest against the official point of protest against the official point of protest against the difficial point of protest against the di Harper's expression was harmful and disruptive, and they demanded that Harper remove the shirt. After that has per remove the shirt. After refusing to do so, Harper was held in detention for the remainder of the day.



as a high-school student, he had the right to express ideas, even unpopu-lar ideas that might deviate from the official viewpoint. Yet in April, a panel of the 9th Circuit ruled 2-1

the official viewpoint. Tet in April, a panel of the bth Circuit ruled 2-1 against Harper and, in the process, weakened high-school students' right to free speech. The vigorous expression of a point-of-view at dolds with the official, prevailing point of view was seen as disruptive, as a form of harassment of gay students. Only one point of view, the official one, was to be allowed on the Day of Silence. In his short-sightled majority opinion, Justice Stephen Reinhardt, well-known as one of the nation's most politically correct idedral ap-pellate-court judges, bizarrely inter-preted a prior Supreme Court deci-sion, *Tinker v. Des Moines*, 333 U.S. 503, (1969), when he determined that Harper's T-shirt constituted an "irrasion of the idefinition of reedom Harper sued, believing that, even preme Court's definition of freedom

from such a personal invasion include the right of minorities (a only minorities, as he clarifies) to go about their day unoffended. In doing so, Reinhardt eschewed the fundamental First Amendment no-tion that the antidote to what some-one might consider bad speech is - but

more good speech in response. In the provided speech in response. A lot Kozinski, a libertarian and possibly the single least po-licially correct judge of our day, attacked the majority's reasoning: "I have considerable difficulty with giving school authorities the power to decide that uonly one side of a con-troversial topic may be discussed in the school environment because the opposing point of view is too extreme or demeaning.... [The machorizanywhere in the record or in the law."

Indeed, in his majority opinion Reinhardt does more than create a right to suppress viewpoints that minority students (and administraminority students (and administra-tors) deem officianise and detrimen-tal to their "sense of self-worth." The Harper decision paves the way for blatant viewpoint discrimination in high schools across the nation, whenever the censored message touches upon issues that minorities hold dear. What members of the majority fail to understand is that, in the long run, members of histori-cally unpopular or underprivileged minority groups have achieved cally unpopular or underprivileged minority groups have achieved legal equality in our society not by suppressing free speech but by vigorously exercising it. The 9th Circuit is doing these groups, and all of us, no favors.

Michael Oberst is a junior at Rox-bury Latin School in Boston. He was an intern this summer with the Foundation for Individual Rights in